The State of Diaspora Voting in Africa and Other Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis with Nigeria
Executive Summary Diaspora voting has gained considerable momentum worldwide. It is the right of citizens living outside their home country to take part in national elections. In Africa, while several countries have embraced diaspora enfranchisement, many, including Nigeria, stay either hesitant or stagnant. This background policy brief examines global and African trends in diaspora voting. It finds lessons Nigeria can learn. It also recommends a pathway for institutionalizing diaspora voting rights in Nigeria.
Introduction
The phenomenon of migration has expanded the footprint of national populations beyond territorial boundaries. It creates dynamic diasporas that influence politics, economics, and culture in their countries of origin. Recognizing their growing relevance, many nations have adopted diaspora voting to strengthen democratic participation and harness diaspora engagement. In Nigeria, constitutional and logistical barriers have hindered diaspora voting despite persistent advocacy. As the world moves toward more inclusive political systems, Nigeria risks marginalizing an important segment of its citizenry. An estimated 17 million Nigerians in the diaspora will be affected if reforms are not urgently prioritized.
Global Trends: Beyond Africa
Diaspora voting is more advanced globally than in Africa.
France: French citizens abroad have 11 dedicated seats in the National Assembly. Italy: Italians abroad elect members of Parliament directly from overseas constituencies. India: While India allows expatriates to vote, actual implementation is restrictive; physical presence at Indian polling stations is needed. Mexico: Mexican citizens abroad can vote in presidential elections via mail and, recently, online. United States: Americans living abroad can vote via absentee ballots for federal elections.
Key Insights Globally:
§ Most advanced democracies allow remote voting: absentee ballots, postal voting, online platforms.
§ Recognizing the diaspora’s economic power (e.g., remittances), many countries actively promote political inclusion as a bridge to investment and soft diplomacy.
The African Experience: Diaspora Voting Trends
Country
Status of Diaspora Voting
Notes
South Africa
Permitted
Diaspora votes in presidential elections at embassies.
Ghana
Permitted (since 2006)
Implementation is partial; technical barriers remain.
Kenya
Permitted (since 2013)
Limited to presidential elections; logistical issues persist.
Senegal
Fully Permitted
Diaspora elects legislators dedicated to overseas constituencies.
Mali
Fully Permitted
Diaspora voting well-integrated; dedicated diaspora seats in parliament.
Tunisia
Fully Permitted
Tunisians abroad elect their own representatives.
Nigeria
Not Permitted
Constitutional constraints; no enabling law.
“Key Insights from Africa:
§ Countries like Senegal and Mali not only allow diaspora voting but grant diaspora citizens dedicated legislative representation.
§ In most African nations that permit diaspora voting, it is often restricted to presidential elections due to logistical simplicity.
§ Implementation challenges remain (e.g., voter registration abroad, verification, cost management), but political will has consistently driven reforms.
Nigeria’s Position and Challenges
Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and the continent’s biggest recipient of remittances, receiving $20 billion annually. Still, Nigeria lags behind peers in diaspora enfranchisement.
Key challenges include
§ Constitutional Restrictions: Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution does not offer for external voting.
§ Lack of Political Will: Successive governments have expressed support but have neglected to push legislation or constitutional amendments.
§ Institutional Readiness: INEC’s ability to conduct credible elections domestically raises concerns about expansion abroad.
§ Logistical Concerns: Cost implications, voter verification abroad, security, and diplomatic coordination are cited as barriers.
Recommendations for Nigeria
1. Constitutional Amendment: Urgently focus on an amendment to allow external voting for presidential elections initially.
2. Legislative Framework: Enact enabling laws specifying the scope, procedures, and institutions responsible for diaspora voting.
3. Pilot Programs: Test diaspora voting in select countries with significant Nigerian populations (e.g., USA, UK, South Africa, Canada) during the next general election cycle.
4. Capacity Building for INEC: Invest in training and digital tools. Collaborate with embassies to ease diaspora voter registration and balloting.
5. Public Awareness Campaigns: Build trust and demand through education targeting both diaspora citizens and domestic stakeholders.
Conclusion
Diaspora voting is no longer a luxury but a democratic imperative in a globalized world. Nigeria’s failure to enfranchise its diaspora community contradicts its aspirations for inclusive governance and development. Comparative experiences from Africa and beyond show that the political, logistical, and constitutional hurdles Nigeria faces are surmountable. Overcoming them requires political will and strategic planning. Now is the time to act!
The author, Collins Nweke, was Chairperson Emeritus of Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) Europe from 2011 to 2013. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators. He holds a PhD (honoris causa) in Governance.
Upfront I want to say that it would be a mistake and a disservice to reality, to declare multiculturalism dead. It is, instead, undergoing a difficult, sometimes painful, evolution. This evolution is pensive. I have lived this tension firsthand. I am a husband raising a family between cultures. I am a father watching my European-born sons navigate identity in spaces that sometimes subtly questioned their belonging. I am a first-time young grandfather now contemplating what Europe my grandson will inherit. He is a beautiful mix of African Nigerian and European Belgian heritage. Will he be capable of entering any room on this continent not as a “token” of diversity? Will he be capable of enter simply as a European, fully at home?
That evidence of the evolution is there if we choose to see it. We see it in our sons and their generation. They do not beg for belonging. But they claim it confidently as their right. The claim is clear in the job interviews they attend, where their skills, not colour, are put in the focus. It is clear in daring to negotiate a pay raise audaciously. This comes after a positive work evaluation. They use a tone that suggests they are happy to leave if not sufficiently appreciated. Younger generations of different colours and creed across Belgium and Europe are more cosmopolitan. They are not chained to narrow definitions of identity. They are growing up bilingual, trilingual, seamlessly blending cultures. Intercultural marriages are steadily increasing. Public life, once overwhelmingly homogenous, is beginning to reflect the diverse societies it serves. The other reality that we must choose to see is that there remains much ground to cover.
When I first arrived in Belgium, wide-eyed and armed with youthful idealism, the word “multiculturalism” seemed like a promise. I saw it as a living testament that people from all walks of life could coexist, contribute, and thrive together. It wasn’t long before I realized a disparity existed. The ideal was spoken about in polished policy documents and political speeches. However, its practice was more complicated and deeply human. The first reality that hit me involved a debate. Should our Ostend City Council do a needs analysis of the living conditions of new migrants? Or should they adopt and adapt one done elsewhere? The debate revealed a divide. Some genuinely want to know the needs of new co-inhabitants. Others didn’t care if a new local integration policy was based on skewed data. They simply want to be seen as having done something required of them by higher authorities.
I am a first-generation Nigerian diaspora. I carried more than just my suitcase. I also carried my culture, my dreams, and my resolve. Over the years, I have watched Belgium, and indeed Europe, wrestle with the beauty and the burden of diversity. The truth is, multiculturalism here is a work in progress. It is messy, imperfect, often frustrating, but, at its core, full of promise.
I experienced this duality firsthand when I joined the Belgian Civil Service in the Municipal Department of Social Welfare. Before my entry, many of those I would eventually call colleagues only knew me from a distance. As a co-social activist, a neighbour, a community member, an “outsider-friend,” if you will. But becoming a colleague was different; a big Black man occupying that professional space was, for many, an unfamiliar sight. It was not hostility in the open sense. Instead, there was a persistent tension that hovered in small gestures. There were also quiet exclusions, subtle intimidation, and awkward silences.
I persevered because I had to. I did it not just for myself as first in the role. I did it for the other migrants who looked up to me. They believed their dreams could find space here too. Slowly, for most, the discomfort gave way to acceptance. But for a tiny minority, it remained unacceptable till the end. Their frozen stares and silent disapproval were daily reminders that the journey towards true multiculturalism is not linear. It is layered with human frailty. Still, I walked the path with my head high. I knew that every small victory widened the road for those who would come after me.
The most defining moment of my public life came when I was elected. I was the first non-Belgian-born person to hold political office in West Flanders. It was historic, yet deeply disorienting for many. It wasn’t overt rejection I faced, but a palpable uncertainty. Many simply didn’t know what to do with me. They were unsure how to place me. They struggled to welcome me into a tradition. Until then, it had seen political leadership through only one cultural lens.
But again, I leaned not on validation, but on my mandate. My mandate is the sacred trust of the people who elected me. People who saw in me not just an outsider, but a partner in their collective future. I navigated the complex terrains of politics. Subtle exclusions often hurt more than explicit ones. These experiences taught me the value of resilience over resentment. It taught me that representation is not just about occupying a seat at the table. It’s about reshaping the table itself. This allows for many more seats to be added for all who are yet to come.
Increasingly, the future of Europe must go beyond multiculturalism, which is the respectful coexistence of distinct communities. It should move toward interculturalism. Here, genuine dialogue, interaction, and mutual transformation become the norm. Mine was Europe of multiculturalism. It was about learning to live side by side. The Europe I dream of for my grandson is that of interculturalism. It should be about daring to live together, hand in hand. Not in fear of losing our distinctiveness, but in the confidence that our shared humanity enriches us all. Stated differently, multiculturalism brought us thus far; interculturalism should take us further. Multiculturalism and interculturalism in Europe are not about achieving perfect harmony. They are about the willingness to keep trying, to keep talking, and to keep building. Together!
My own journey has taught me a few things. Perseverance, compassion, and open-hearted honesty are still the best compasses we have. And with those in hand, I remain an optimist. Not a blind one, but a stubborn one. Even though we have stumbled, I believe in Belgium. I believe Europe and all of us who call it home will find a way ahead. Not just side by side, but hand in hand. When, not if we succeed, multiculturalism will give way for interculturalism. It will no longer be an embattled concept in Belgium and Europe. It will simply be the way things are. That should be the Europe worth fighting for.
These reflections by Collins Nweke came on the heels of #EuropeDay2025. Belgian of Nigerian roots, Collins is former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council Belgium. He is a husband, active father and grandfather who sees himself as a global citizen.
I am a (grand)father. But long before that, I was a first generation diaspora. I carried not just a suitcase. Instead, I brought a whole continent of stories, customs, fears, and hopes. I carried them across the ocean, from Nigeria to Belgium.
Crossroads of heritage
When I arrived in Europe, I knew I was entering a world that spoke a different language. Not just French or Dutch or German. But a language of culture, of history, of what it means to belong. And yet, I stayed. I worked. And we raised a family.
Our sons were born here. Belgium is the only home they have ever truly known. From the time they were old enough to walk, we tried to raise them on two legs. One planted in the orderly cobblestones of Europe, and the other in the red earth of our Igbo heritage. We visited Nigeria reasonably often. Christmas in Lagos, New Year in Ichi, Nnewi. Easter in Abuja, Iwaji and Ifejioku back in our Igbuzo hometown. They drank Zobo. But also Fanta in glass bottles, tongues painted orange, to their delight. And they learned to greet elders in Igbo: Omogwu, Oliofe, Akukalia, Amuapa,…They knew the songs. They danced at Ibunmanya traditional marriages. They buried their fingers in pounded yam and egwusi soup. They sometimes even asked for more jollof rice.
But by the time the older son turned 15, the visits stopped.
Nigeria had started changing. But they also started making their own Easter, summer, and Christmas plans with their friends.
Did Nigeria really change or it revealed more of what it had always been: fragile, violent, neglected? Our homeland still wakes early to call upon the ancestors on our behalf. My own father is now nearing the sunset of his life at 98. Meanwhile, mother’s mother, 101, in Ichi, still remembers the Biafran war like it was yesterday. But today, we can’t even say for certain they are safe.
My son is now a father himself. His son – my grandson – is five. A lively, curious boy with the wild laughter of a hyena cub and the soft curls of his Belgian mother. My son wants him to know Nigeria too like he did. He wants to stop and show him the Atakpo river before entering Igbuzo. He’d like to take him to Okpuzu river and drink from the stream. Maybe even wash his head and face, calling on goddess Oboshi to take charge, fight his battles. He probably wants to take a dive into the river like I did with him. He wants to have his head touched and blessed by the great-grandparents whose blood runs in his veins. But the road home no longer feels like a road. It feels like a battlefield.
“Daddy,” he said to me yesterday over breakfast, voice low, pained. “How do I take my wife and son into a country where churches are bombed? Roads are unsafe, and children are kidnapped from school?” How can I explain to my Belgian wife? She doesn’t understand. It is considered fine when a police officer points an AK47 at you at a traffic checkpoint. The officer’s eyes are deep red and stone-faced. Yes I survived it. It felt cool to me at the time because I had seen it in Nigerian films. Nollywood playing out live. Yes, I saw it often in the Naija movies. You and Mummy watched these films. You got us to watch them too. It served as a partial introduction to our ancestral homeland. They do not have all of that orientation”
I had no answer. I am his father. Fathers are supposed to have answers. Frustrating!
Instead, I gave him what we fathers often give when our strength fails: perspective wrapped in silence. I tried to tell him, gently, that we are not the only ones caught between worlds. Sometimes, we must carry our culture not in our luggage. We carry it in our habits, in our stories, and in how we name our children. I reminded him that we named him Tonna and his brother Chidi. We must carry our culture in what we teach them to love.
Still, I see the ache in his eyes. The guilt of a son who can’t take his own child to see his roots. The fear that something irreplaceable is being lost in translation.
He loves Nigeria as a land and the people in it. He blames Nigeria, its broken politics, its indifferent governance. He even praises Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso. I don’t blame him. Nigeria has failed many of us, repeatedly. Yet I find myself defending the homeland still. Not out of naivety. But out of something older: loyalty, or the stubborn refusal to give up on the soil that birthed me.
My grandson asks, “Nnanna, where is Nigeria?” and I tell him, “It’s where your name Nweke comes from. It’s the reason you dance so well. It’s the energy in you and the loudness of your laughter. It’s the place where your great-grandma sings to the moon and greatgrandpa pours libations to the gods. My mother, your Nne-Nnanna of blessed memory, rests there.”
I don’t know if he understands. But I hope one day he will. I also nurse the distant hope that he will someday meet his great-grandparents before they join Nne-Nnanna and their ancestors.
This story is not just ours. It belongs to millions like us. African families straddling two continents, trying to stitch together identity with threadbare fabric. Europeans raising children with heritage they barely comprehend. Diaspora parents mourning the loss of what they couldn’t pass on, and children resenting what they never received.
But here’s the truth: culture does not die in silence. It dies in forgetting.
So, we must keep remembering. We must keep telling the stories, even if we can’t visit the places. For now! We must cook the food. We must speak the names. We must light the ancestral candles. We must even pour libations that we do not fully understand or agree with their import. And then, we must hope that one day; when the guns fall silent and the roads are safe; our children and their children can walk back across the bridge we’ve spent our lives trying to build.
The author, Collins Nweke is Belgian of Nigerian roots. A former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council Belgium, he is a husband an active father and grandfather.
During my tenure in a Green political office, I faced a daunting energy policy delimma concerning transition economies. It was about taking a firm position on an aggressive push for transition to renewable energy by emerging economies. Seen as a pathway to a sustainable and resilient future, my party is non compromising on making fossil fuels a thing of the past. I recall a challenging debate at the African Carebbean and Pacific (ACP) secretariat during my bid for a seat in the European Parliament. A co-debater representing the business-leaning Belgian Liberals made an impassionate case for nuclear power as the new godsend for global energy security. When he was done, the skilful moderator turned to me and in a well calculated tone, she went: Honourable Nweke, you want no nuclear power stations, you are reported to hold the private view that attempts to get Africa to join the clean energy transition is harassment. What exactly do you want?
For a split second, I was frozen. However, I quickly gathered my thoughts. I then made a start “As Greens, we…” to which the lady promptly interjected “Not the Greens Honourable Nweke. The question is What Do YOU Want?” I then made a second attempt. Very well then. Let me correct one misconception: I see the transition to renewable energy as both necessary and urgent in addressing the global climate crisis. However, I also recognize that an abrupt shift away from fossil fuels, without a just and inclusive strategy, risks causing economic dislocation for many African nations whose economies remain heavily dependent on oil revenues. We need a pragmatic approach. A strategy rooted in accelerating clean energy adoption while investing in economic diversification, workforce retraining, and equitable development to ensure no one is left behind in the transition.
I stood by that position. When I argue that oil is not a dead commodity for Africa, I do not mince words. However, we are at an interregnum where emerging economies like my native Nigeria need to equally be told the inconvenient truth about the politics and economics of renewable energy. This involves a complex interplay of domestic policy, foreign relations, market forces, and structural challenges. This is more so especially when viewed through the lens of international trade and bilateralism. Overreliance on Oil export is a major issue. Nigeria’s economy remains heavily dependent on crude oil. Now is the ideal time to argue that investing in renewable energy will diversify energy sources and reduce vulnerability to global oil price shocks. Linked to that is import dependence as the country imports most of its refined petroleum products. Renewables will urgently help reduce this dependency culture.
Nigeria is facing one of its worst power shortages, with the national grid collapsing and leaving many homes and businesses without power. This makes Nigeria one of the world’s most vulnerable countries in terms of energy. There are a number of alternate energy sources that Nigeria can begin immediately to adopt from Europe, even from little brave Belgium. The problem with energy security in Nigeria is well known and well documented and therefore needs no further analysis. So, focusing on the solutions should be the reasonable thing to do. Talking of solutions, the first thing that comes to mind is the abundant sunlight year-round, that Nigeria is blessed with. Nigeria has an average solar radiation of 5.5 kWh/m²/day, which is significantly higher than Belgium’s 2.8 kWh/m²/day. This makes solar power a highly viable option for Nigeria. The fact that Rural Electrification Agency (REA) solar mini grids exist in Nigeria tells us that there is at least a sense that Nigeria knows what to do. REA as initiative needs scaling up.
Wind Energy potential is moderate in most regions, but areas like Sokoto, Kano, and Jos have significant wind resources. I guess the combination of onshore and offshore installations in Belgian wind energy infrastructure offers valuable lessons for Nigeria. Small to medium wind farms and hybrid energy systems could help Nigeria in combining solar and wind.
I am tempted not to overlook the potentials in hydropower for Nigeria with its vast water resources. There’s abundance of large and small rivers. While large hydropower projects are operational for instance the Kainji Dam, I have not stopped dreaming of small-scale hydropower in my Igbuzo hometown, in the Okpuzu and Atakpo rivers where I went swimming as a child. Numerous such rural river resources are scattered across the length and breadth of the country and can boost off-grid energy access. In other words, mini- and micro-hydropower plants for remote areas harbour unexplored energy potentials for Nigeria.
Biomass and Biogas is an option too. Nigeria generates a significant amount of agricultural and local waste that can be converted into energy. Farm residues, animal waste, and urban waste could be used for power generation and cooking gas. This is one viable way to address energy needs in rural areas and reduce environmental pollution. Of course I’m not losing sight of the strategic investments, supportive policies, and commitment to sustainable practices that is required here. Out here in Belgium, we have done so much since 2009 in integrating biomass and biogas in our energy mix, but it is not yet uhuru because of the challenges involved. It won’t be different for Nigeria.
On energy mix, would not play down any potential for achieving an energy mix for Nigeria no matter how small it is. With the few volcanic and hot spring regions in Nigeria, I will not exclude the potential for Geothermal Energy. In this regard, I think of Jos, Biu, and Mambilla Plateaux. Just as I believe that some hot springs from the Southwest to the far North, have great potentials. I recall with melancholy, geography lessons even in Umejei Primary School and later in St. Thomas’s College where we got acquainted with Ikogosi Warm Spring, Ruwan Zafi Hot Spring, Wikki Warm Spring in Yankari National Park, and Akiti Warm Spring, I believe in present day Nasarawa State. With enough will, Nigeria can easily surpass Belgium in small-scale geothermal systems for localized heating and electricity. I’m sure Belgium will readily transfer skills and knowledge and technology in this area if Nigeria asks nicely because there are also business potentials in it. Belgium is open for business.
Renewable energy as a clean energy source that is climate friendly is quite sustainable. Many countries are dependent on it but in Nigeria it is a different ball game on account of several limitations that impede on its development. When Nigeria becomes the subject of harassment, if I may borrow from the merciless debate moderator, less questions are being asked about how these challenges could be addressed. What international trade opportunities exist?
First and foremost, we must look at Nigerian Government Policy and Investment. The secured private sector participation must be encouraged through intentional public policies and legislative frameworks. Public-private partnership (PPPs) arrangements could be sealed to bridge finance gaps for renewable energy projects. Government must show openness in inviting international partners to the space as part of Nigeria’s intentional foreign policy. The 5D Renewed Foreign Policy mantra of current administration made provisions for this in the pillar around Development & Diaspora. The Diaspora has a role cut out here for them as a number of them are in the renewable energy space. Global Green Investment trends offer good lessons on how international investors are shifting toward green energy projects. Nigeria could attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Collaborations with countries like Belgium, Germany, or Denmark, and even China, could bring in advanced renewable technology, especially solar and wind, if the table is organised through sound public policies.
Nigeria–Belgium Collaboration Opportunities in Renewable Energy
Belgium and Nigeria have complementary strengths that position them for mutually beneficial cooperation in renewable energy. There are strategic areas for business-to-business (B2B), government-to-government (G2G), and business to government (B2G) collaboration in infrastructure development as well as research and development.
Infrastructure Development
Ample Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities exist in Solar Mini-Grids & Off-Grid Electrification where there can be collaboration between Belgian firms like 3E, GreenPulse and Nigerian developers to scale off-grid solar power for rural communities. There is also the Waste-to-Energy Solutions. In Belgian technology providers, VYNCKE, Nigeria does have a partner. There are indications that Nigerian agro-industrial firms could partner here to convert biomass into renewable energy. Nigeria needs not reinvent the wheels in Smart Port & Logistics Infrastructure when in more ways than one, Belgium’s Port of Antwerp-Bruges have shown readiness to provide the expertise needed to help green Nigerian ports. The Lagos Port could take advantage of this opportunity should they be serious about reducing carbon emissions in maritime logistics.
There is also Government-to-Government (G2G) opportunities to explore. There can be cooperation through EU–Nigeria Green Deal initiatives for infrastructure financing and technical support under Bilateral Green Transition Framework. This is independent of development and cooperation through Enabel, Belgium’s development agency. Again their willingness and ability to fund renewable energy infrastructure in public health and education institutions in Nigeria is no hidden agenda.
Research & Development (Education & Awareness)
Just like in infrastructure development, Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities are there to exploit for instance in Green Skills Training. Private training providers can play a role in this space. Belgian vocational institutions like Syntra Vlaanderen can co-develop technical certification programmes with Nigerian polytechnics for solar and wind technicians, to leave it at just one example. Belgian and Nigerian media firms could initiate joint public awareness campaigns to co-produce for instance educational content on renewable energy and climate literacy.
Under Government-to-Government (G2G), public universities could seal University Research Partnerships. Joint academic programs between Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Ghent University, and Universities of Lagos and Port Harcourt, comes to mind in the domain of clean energy innovation. There can also be curriculum development support with Belgium, given its databank of knowledge acquired over the years. This could provide support in the integration of renewable energy and sustainability into Nigeria’s national curriculum.
Nigeria and the rest of the renewable energy world
There is the dimension of geopolitics of energy that Nigeria needs to watch in terms of the evolving oil diplomacy versus Green diplomacy. As the world shifts toward renewables, Nigeria’s oil-based diplomatic leverage will wane. Here it is not a matter of if, but that of when it will wane. Embracing renewables could open new partnerships in climate finance from the EU, US, or UN. As signatory to the Paris Agreement, Nigeria will be under global pressure to honour its climate commitments. It is hard to admit but Nigeria’s renewable energy policies are influenced by international expectations and access to climate funding like the Green Climate Fund. Only time will tell if these are in Nigeria’s National and security interests.
As many international investors are shifting toward green energy projects, Nigeria could attract FDI into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Nigeria needs smart tariff policies to support local industry without discouraging investment realising that import duties on solar panels or wind turbines can either stimulate or stifle renewable adoption. With the right policies in place and given the current appetite for inter-Africa trade, Nigeria could become a regional hub for solar panel assembly or biomass fuel if it builds capacity and leverages trade agreements like AfCFTA.
END
The author, Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium, where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves on its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
The Trump-Zelenskyy Oval Office debacle has led to many unsolicited advice to a desperate Ukrainian President on how he ought to have handled an erratic American President. I laughed at some, got offended, if not angry, at others. Yet some got me thinking. They got me thinking of a few incidents during my time as municipal legislator at Ostend City Council, Belgium. Let me single out two particular incidents.
One was during the first of my three terms. I had just been sworn in. While learning the legislative rope, all buried in piles of briefing notes, books, and handouts, I relied for guidance in the interim, on my sense of right and wrong, my ideological persuasion if you like, and my Green Party political lines, especially the issues on which we were elected. One of the items slated for a vote in one of my early sittings was approval of procedure for employment of ‘Student Vacation Jobbers’ at the department for social welfare in whose board I served at the time.
Asking around, I discovered that the vacant positions were never published by the department. The order of allocation of student job positions was for Councillors to bring in their children. If, as Councillor, we had no school-age children of 16 years or older, we could bring in anyone of our choosing. Next in rank were the staff of the department in order of seniority. If there are any places left after filling these anointed priority places, the Council Chairman will then handpick party royals to favour with the positions.
My immediate reaction was that this must be wrong and that it must stop. I quickly put together a brief interpellation in which I pointed out that I do not feel comfortable giving my teenage son priority over other kids just because I, his dad, happened to be Councillor. Equality of chance presupposes that we should open up the space for all kids irrespective of background. Let the best candidates get the jobs.
If we must favour any group, I argued, then let us prioritise kids from families in poverty or that are facing threats of poverty. We know who they are because their parents are our clients on income support. They lack the network to facilitate getting vacation job for their kids, which we all have in abundance. If we are serious about breaking generational poverty, let us consider spreading our tentacles to directions that will effectively break the poverty circle. I then acknowledged that this procedure has been in place for a very long time and that I do not intend to cause avoidable disruption and administrative bottleneck. I therefore will not vote against but will request that in the course of the year, we must revisit the procedure and abandon the old order.
A couple of days later, a journalist contacted me to say that he had picked the story up from somewhere. The Council Chairman had denied my side of the story, stating that during the entire Council sitting in question, I uttered no word. “As a matter of fact, Councillor Collins Nweke was one of the first to vote in support of the motion”, he declared to the journalist. He detested this cowardly attitude of keeping quiet during proceedings only to open the mouth wide with journalist to tell lies. He went comically further to say that if elections were close by, he would have suggested that I was suffering from early symptoms of election fever.
My teenage son who had applied for a place, became a casualty of the entire episode. He got punished because his dad spoke up. As applicant, rather than posting him to a work post as close to his home as possible, as is the standard practice, he was allocated a student job place as far away from home as possible with basically an impossible public transport connection. But the young man understood and made the best out of that first experience as student worker. On the benefit of hindsight, I would have applied the doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity by abstaining rather than voting for or against. Useful lesson learnt.
Second incident was during my second term. The Mayor pushed for a Bill to reform parts of our policy on the local economy. I felt that a part of the unintended consequences of the proposed Bill will be bankruptcy for businesses owned by a large segment of ethnic minority entrepreneurs. In specific terms, a few business cum residential districts were adjudged to be attracting higher number of corner shops offering ethnic products and night shops. And with that, a perception of insecurity was felt by some local residents who felt that ‘their City’ was being overtaken by migrants. They feel like ‘strangers’ in their homes and all of those social stereotypical sentiments. Others who owned homes in the districts were worried that their properties were being devalued as a consequence of the population shift and mix.
Though I had the economy portfolio as well as equality rights within my caucus and the policy was mine to drive, we have a culture of consensus, preferably or majority carries the vote. To cut long story short, I was more or less alone within my caucus in my opposition against the reform. That is not to say that my party colleagues supported the reform full force, though one of us silently wished for it to pass because he had a property there. The general feeling is more of not ignoring the concerns of voters who may not be racist but feel insecure or vulnerable with the changing demography of our cherished city.
The big question is what do we do? Politically, it will be murderous for us to vote in support of the Bill because we can’t defend it with our core support base. Voting against it, which was my first inclination, was feared to be counterproductive with some of our voters that favoured the Bill. My sense was that most of my colleagues, maybe all, would vote yes if we allowed the notion of voting only your heart. In the end we agreed on kicking in the doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity. The compromise was that we will abstain from voting and will offer no clear explanation for or against. We will do all we can to empower the affected group of the proposed reform with information and administrative support where needed.
These two incidents pulled out of my personal experience in politics are meant to provide a preface to the unsolicited thoughts I equally want to join in proffering on Nigeria’s approach towards the Russia-Ukraine war. I believe that it is the same doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity which I have had reasons to either apply or support a number of times in my political career that I believe Nigeria is deploying in dealing with the Russia-Ukraine war.
The doctrine is a strategic foreign policy approach where a country deliberately avoids taking a clear or definitive stance on a contentious international issue. This doctrine allows states to maintain flexibility, avoid alienating key partners, and retain room for diplomatic maneuvering. By refusing to openly align with any side in a conflict or dispute, a country can maximize its options, protect its interests, and reduce the risk of becoming entangled in the rivalries of larger powers.
Like in basically all things, applying the doctrine comes with some consequences. I can therefore safely imagine that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and his team, must have weighed the pros and cons before stepping in to brief Mr President and recommend Nigeria’s position.
As the largest economy and most populous nation in Africa, Nigeria plays a pivotal role in shaping African responses to global crises. Its foreign policy traditionally balances non-alignment, economic pragmatism, and regional leadership. Historically, Nigeria has positioned itself as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), avoiding entanglement in distant geopolitical conflicts and great power struggles. Maintaining ambiguity aligns with this tradition and reinforces sovereignty in decision-making, prioritizing domestic economic development, regional stability in West Africa, and preserving ties with all major powers. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Nigeria has leaned slightly toward the Western stance, condemning Russian aggression in UN votes but avoiding strident rhetoric or severing ties with Moscow. This in practical terms reflects textbook application of the doctrine of ambiguity.
In the choices that Nigeria makes, it must think of the preservation of its strategic relationships. The country maintains strong economic ties with the West, including investment, aid, trade, and military cooperation, particularly through partnerships with the EU, UK, and US. But in the same vein, it has growing military and energy ties with Russia, including cooperation in areas like oil exploration, arms procurement, and nuclear technology. Being diplomatic ambiguous ensures it does not alienate either side.
There are also gains in economic diversification that Nigeria needs to consider. Its reliance on Western capital markets and development finance institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Bank is crucial for the country’s economic recovery and infrastructure investment. The counterbalance here is that Russia’s role in the global oil and gas markets aligns with Nigeria’s interests as an energy exporter. Nigeria benefits when high oil prices, driven by geopolitical uncertainty, bolster government revenues.
The Minister must have also considered the need for flexibility for future alliances in his memo to Mr President. I summise that by not fully committing to either bloc, Nigeria can adapt its position based on how the war evolves and how global power shifts play out, ensuring diplomatic maneuverability.
Timing they say can be everything. With pressing domestic challenges like high youth unemployment and restiveness, security crises up North, spate of kidnappings, and efforts at economic diversification away from oil, of which the Nigerian Export Promotion Council reports over 20% growth in 2024, the Minister may have reasoned that Nigeria benefits from focusing inward rather than spending diplomatic capital on a distant European conflict.
There is also the regional leadership dimension and African consensus to consider. A diplomatic ambiguous position allows Nigeria to play a consensus-building role within the African Union (AU), where member states have differing views on the crisis. The Minister may have felt that Nigeria is better off projecting itself as a unifying force, keeping Africa’s voice independent and cohesive in global forums.
Decisions around positioning a consequential country like Nigeria in an issue of global dimension like the Russia-Ukraine war do not come easy. There are a few risks to consider in applying the Doctrine of Ambiguity. For a start, there is the Western pressure and perception issues to contend with. Nigeria’s relatively soft stance on Russia could be viewed negatively by the EU, UK, and US who expect clearer alignment in defense of international law and territorial sovereignty. Who knows how this could affect Nigeria’s access to Western investment, security partnerships, and climate finance, which are critical for its long-term development agenda? Early indications for instance are that some African countries like Kenya that took a clear pro-West stance have seen increased trade and investment benefits from Western governments looking to reward loyalty. Nigeria faces potential risks of being seen as fence-sitting, forfeiting opportunities to negotiate preferential trade or security deals from either side.
There is the moral and ethical concerns to contend with. Nigeria aspires to moral leadership in Africa, rooted in its history of anti-apartheid activism and peacekeeping leadership. Avoiding a clear stance risks eroding Nigeria’s moral authority on global governance issues.
Not trading carefully can lead to internal political divisions giving Nigeria’s internal political divisions. The country has a complex domestic political environment, with historical ties to both the West and Russia through Cold War-era military cooperation. Internal pro-Russia, pro-Ukraine, and pro-West factions within the government, academia, Diaspora, and media could exploit ambiguity, framing it as indecision, lack of vision, or maybe even ‘stomach infrastructure’ where some Nigerians in the Russian Diaspora are being accused without evidence of acting as paid agents of the Russian Federation to spread propaganda.
One of the most vexing risks that Nigeria faces in taking the route of diplomatic ambiguity is reduced influence in global governance. Its ambition to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council or take leadership on major global issues such as development financing or advocacy for Africa on climate adaptation could be undermined if it is seen as unwilling to take clear, principled positions on defining issues like Ukraine.
In the final analysis, there is a balancing act for Nigeria to undertake. Its application of the doctrine of ambiguity in the Russia-Ukraine crisis is pragmatic. It allows the country to preserve vital economic and security relationships while staying true to its non-aligned heritage. However, as a continental leader, Nigeria faces higher expectations to articulate an African perspective on global crises, particularly in light of its aspirations for global leadership. Nigeria could fine-tune its diplomatic ambiguity into a constructive diplomatic neutrality, where it condemns violations of international law such as territorial aggression while also advocating for African interests, including ensuring food security, energy price stability, and non-punitive responses toward African economies impacted by sanctions spillover. This may be a good strategy for Africa’s dominant economy to position itself as a mediator capable of facilitating dialogue between Russia, Ukraine, and global powers, leveraging its status as a respected African power.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
Trump has inadvertently done the impossible. He made the EU stronger and brought the UK closer to the EU than even when we were in it. A European military is now a certainty. It will include the UK and other European countries not in the EU.
Europe is at a critical turning point in its history. The American shield is crumbling, Ukraine risks being abandoned, and Russia strengthened. Washington has become the court of Nero, a fiery emperor, submissive courtiers, and a ketamine-fueled jester in charge of purging the civil service.
This is a tragedy for the free world, but it is first and foremost a tragedy for the United States. Trump’s message is that there is no point in being his ally since he will not defend you. He will impose more customs duties on you than on his enemies. He will threaten to seize your territories while supporting the dictatorships that invade you.
The king of the deal is showing what the art of the deal is all about. He thinks he will intimidate China by lying down before Putin. But Xi Jinping, faced with such a shipwreck, is probably accelerating preparations for the invasion of Taiwan.
Never in history has a President of the United States capitulated to the enemy. Never has anyone supported an aggressor against an ally. Never has anyone trampled on the American Constitution, issued so many illegal decrees, dismissed judges who could have prevented him from doing so, dismissed the military general staff in one fell swoop, weakened all checks and balances, and taken control of social media.
This is not an illiberal drift. It is the beginning of the confiscation of democracy. Let us remember that it took only one month, three weeks, and two days to bring down the Weimar Republic and its Constitution.
I have faith in the strength of American democracy, and the country is already protesting. But in one month, Trump has done more harm to America than in four years of his last presidency. We were at war with a dictator, and now we are fighting a dictator backed by a traitor.
Eight days ago, at the very moment that Trump was rubbing Macron’s back in the White House, the United States voted at the UN with Russia and North Korea against the Europeans demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops.
Two days later, in the Oval Office, the military service shirker was giving war hero Zelensky lessons in morality and strategy before dismissing him like a groom, ordering him to submit or resign. Tonight, he took another step into infamy by stopping the delivery of weapons that had been promised. What to do in the face of this betrayal? The answer is simple: face it.
And first of all, let’s not be mistaken. The defeat of Ukraine would be the defeat of Europe. The Baltic States, Georgia, and Moldova are already on the list. Putin’s goal is to return to Yalta, where half the continent was ceded to Stalin.
The countries of the South are waiting for the outcome of the conflict to decide whether they should continue to respect Europe or whether they are now free to trample on it. What Putin wants is the end of the order put in place by the United States and its allies 80 years ago, with its first principle being the prohibition of acquiring territory by force. This idea is at the very source of the UN, where today Americans vote in favor of the aggressor and against the attacked, because the Trumpian vision coincides with that of Putin: a return to spheres of influence, the great powers dictating the fate of small countries.
Mine is Greenland, Panama, and Canada. You are Ukraine, the Baltics and Eastern Europe. He is Taiwan and the China Sea. At the parties of the oligarchs of the Gulf of Mar-a-Lago, this is called “diplomatic realism.” So we are alone. But the talk that Putin can not be resisted is false. Contrary to the Kremlin’s propaganda, Russia is in bad shape. In three years, the so-called second largest army in the world has managed to grab only crumbs from a country three times less populated.
Interest rates at 25%, the collapse of foreign exchange and gold reserves, the demographic collapse show that it is on the brink of the abyss. The American helping hand to Putin is the biggest strategic mistake ever made in a war.
The shock is violent, but it has a virtue. Europeans are coming out of denial. They understood in one day in Munich that the survival of Ukraine and the future of Europe are in their hands and that they have three imperatives.
Accelerate military aid to Ukraine to compensate for the American abandonment, so that it holds, and of course to impose its presence and that of Europe in any negotiation.
This will be expensive. It will be necessary to end the taboo of the use of frozen Russian assets. It will be necessary to circumvent Moscow’s accomplices within Europe itself by a coalition of only the willing countries, with, of course, the United Kingdom.
Second, demand that any agreement be accompanied by the return of kidnapped children, prisoners, and absolute security guarantees. After Budapest, Georgia, and Minsk, we know what agreements with Putin are worth. These guarantees require sufficient military force to prevent a new invasion.
Finally, and this is the most urgent, because it is what will take the most time, we must build the neglected European defence, to the benefit of the American umbrella since 1945 and scuttled since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is a Herculean task, but it is on its success or failure that the leaders of today’s democratic Europe will be judged in the history books. Friedrich Merz has just declared that Europe needs its own military alliance. This is to recognize that France has been right for decades in arguing for strategic autonomy.
It remains to be built. It will be necessary to invest massively, to strengthen the European Defence Fund outside the Maastricht debt criteria, to harmonize weapons and munitions systems, to accelerate the entry into the Union of Ukraine, which is today the leading European army, to rethink the place and conditions of nuclear deterrence based on French and British capabilities, to relaunch the anti-missile shield and satellite programs.
The plan announced yesterday by Ursula von der Leyen is a very good starting point. And much more will be needed. Europe will only become a military power again by becoming an industrial power again. In a word, the Draghi report will have to be implemented. For good. But the real rearmament of Europe is its moral rearmament. We must convince public opinion in the face of war weariness and fear, and especially in the face of Putin’s cronies, the extreme right and the extreme left. They argued again yesterday in the National Assembly, Mr Prime Minister, before you, against European unity, against European defense.
They say they want peace. What neither they nor Trump say is that their peace is capitulation, the peace of defeat, the replacement of de Gaulle Zelensky by a Ukrainian Pétain at the beck and call of Putin. Peace for the collaborators who have refused any aid to the Ukrainians for three years. Is this the end of the Atlantic Alliance? The risk is great. But in the last few days, the public humiliation of Zelensky and all the crazy decisions taken in the last month have finally made the Americans react.
Polls are falling. Republican lawmakers are being greeted by hostile crowds in their constituencies. Even Fox News is becoming critical. The Trumpists are no longer in their majesty. They control the executive, the Parliament, the Supreme Court, and social networks. But in American history, the freedom fighters have always prevailed. They are beginning to raise their heads.
The fate of Ukraine is being decided in the trenches. It also depends on those in the United States who want to defend democracy. Our ability to unite Europeans is crucial. We need to find the means for their common defense. Europe must again become the power it once was in history. It hesitates to become that power again. Our parents defeated fascism and communism at great cost. The task of our generation is to defeat the totalitarianism of the 21st century.
Long live free Ukraine, long live democratic Europe.
This is the full text of Claude Malhuret, French Prime Minister, speaking to the French Senate Tuesday 4 March 2025.
When Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso abruptly withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forming the Alliance of Sahel States (also known by its French acronym AES) some did not take them seriously. The olive branch extended by some critical stakeholders keen to see a de-escalation in the crisis began to lower in January 2024 when the trio formally withdrew from the bloc. Anger, resentment, and other emotions may be inevitable. However every prudent leader must realise that a comprehensive and inclusive approach is essential to prevent the AES formation from leading to further regional instability. By fostering dialogue, enhancing security cooperation, and promoting sustainable development, ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community must play a role in building a more united and prosperous West Africa.
Before delving into the specific roles of the core regional, continental, and global stakeholders, it is essential to provide an overview of how we arrived at this point. As of February 2025, the government of Niger Republic has implemented several significant changes to its border regulations, particularly affecting its relationship with Nigeria. There have been border closures and reopenings following the military coup in July 2023. The introduction of new travel documents followed swiftly. In line with AES initiatives, Niger introduced a joint biometric passport for its citizens, to facilitate movement within the alliance. However, this new passport has faced recognition challenges from non-AES countries, like Senegal. This led to trade restrictions, when in October 2024, Niger imposed a comprehensive ban on food exports to countries outside the AES, including Nigeria. This measure was officially positioned as a means to boost agricultural self-reliance within the alliance but it has (unintentionally?) disrupted traditional trade flows between Niger and Nigeria.
Without doubts, these developments reflect Niger’s shift towards strengthening ties with its immediate neighbours within the AES framework, while asserting its sovereignty and redefining its relationships and border policies with countries like Nigeria. The core question remains whether or not Niger has focused only on the gains of its moves and has overlooked the potential losses
Gains and Losses from Niger-Nigeria Border War
The border closures created short-term economic and social hardships, particularly for vulnerable populations and businesses. However, they also presented opportunities for improving national security, promoting local economic development, and asserting political independence. Long-term gains will depend on the success of Niger’s domestic policies and its cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States. We must remember that the first attempt at a Sahel alliance fell apart. Could it be that it will succeed this time around because they are dancing to the tunes of more determined foreign drummers focused on redrawing the World Order? That remains to be seen. But as far as our mortal eyes can carry us, we can’t lose sight of some obvious gains.
The Gains
The gain that springs most obviously to the eyes is security enhancement. The border closures aimed to curb the movement of armed groups, smuggling, and other illicit activities, contributing to national security, particularly in Niger, which faces threats from extremist groups. The border closures led to a temporary reduction in cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking. A boost to domestic production is another important gain in the stride to agricultural self-sufficiency. By reducing dependency on imports, Niger sought to encourage local agricultural production, supporting its intentional national food security goals and local industry sufficiency. The restrictions provided opportunities for local industries to meet domestic demand, fostering industrial growth.
There is also political leverage that we may not discontenance. For Niger, the border closures were part of a broader strategy to assert its sovereignty and negotiate better terms in regional alliances, particularly after its exit from ECOWAS and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The Losses
Analysts for Niger of the costs-benefits of their border strategy have a number of losses to contend with. For a start, economic disruption by way of trade decline is a critical factor. The border closures severely impacted cross-border trade. Both formal and informal trade, including agricultural products, livestock, and manufactured goods, experienced significant reductions. The attendant revenue loss has had significant impact on the fragile economy. Governments of both Niger and Nigeria lost customs duties and taxes collected from cross-border trade, impacting national and local economies. The humanitarian impact manifesting in food insecurity was pretty visible. Niger, which relies on food imports from Nigeria, faced increased food insecurity. Rising food prices worsened conditions for vulnerable populations. Many small-scale traders, transporters, and border communities that depend on cross-border trade for their livelihoods faced economic hardship.
The social and cultural disruptions is another critical loss. It is said that in the border area between Niger and Nigeria, some homes have their living rooms in one country and their bedrooms in the other country. In other words, limited movement and restrictions on free movement of people disrupted daily life. Families and communities with cross-border ties are separated, affecting social cohesion, employment, and education opportunities, especially for those who frequently crossed borders, not to mention the strained diplomatic relations between Niger and Nigeria.
The Strategic Approach
To address the potential crisis resulting from the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, a coordinated and pragmatic approach is essential. ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and the broader international community should prioritize diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, and socioeconomic development to foster regional stability.
ECOWAS as key actor
The ECOWAS has the prime responsibility of demonstrating good faith by efforts at rebuilding trust for regional unity. The bloc is formally on records to have started off well. In its 29 January 2025 Declaration formally acknowledging the withdrawal of the trio of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, it placed a four-point instruction before member states as follows:
1. recognize National passports and identity cards bearing ECOWAS logo held by the citizens of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger, until further notice.
2. continue to treat goods and services coming from the three countries in accordance with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and investment policy.
3. allow citizens of the three affected countries to continue to enjoy the right of visa free movement, residence and establishment in accordance with the ECOWAS protocols until further notice.
4. provide full support and cooperation to ECOWAS officials from the three countries in the course of their assignments for the Community.
Determined to avoid confusion and disruption in the lives and businesses of the ECOWAS population during what it described as a transition period, the instruction to member states added that the arrangements will be in place until the full determination of the modalities of our future engagement with the three countries by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Governments. The Commission has set up a structure to facilitate discussions on these modalities with each of the three countries.
It could be gleaned from the ECOWAS statement that it pays or intends to pay premium to Inclusive Dialogue when it indicated the establishment of requisite structure to facilitate discussions on modalities with each of the three Sahel economies. Without delay and despite the new border regulations announced recently by Niger, ECOWAS should initiate high-level diplomatic dialogues with the AES states, ensuring that their security and governance concerns are addressed within the framework of regional integration. The dialogue should aim to rebuild trust and explore pathways for their re-entry into ECOWAS.
Talking of framework, ECOWAS can be served better by a flexible governance framework. It should consider revising its governance protocols to accommodate the specific political and security challenges faced by Sahel states, promoting inclusivity and understanding. There must be Security Collaboration with the establishment of joint security initiatives with AES to combat terrorism, insurgency, and cross-border crime, reinforcing collective security while respecting the sovereignty of member states.
Some may find this misplaced but from an economic standpoint, providing incentives to AES states is a strategic investment that can restore regional economic integration, stabilise food supply chains, reduce the costs of conflict, and strengthen ECOWAS’s long-term influence. By promoting inclusive economic growth and enhancing trade and infrastructure, ECOWAS can foster a more prosperous and interconnected West Africa, benefiting all member states in the long run.
Of all the arguments in support of a strategic approach to managing the Sahel States crisis, the most compelling perhaps is the need to maintain strategic geopolitical and economic influence. Providing economic incentives reinforces ECOWAS’s role as the primary regional organization, strengthening its influence and maintaining regional cohesion. There is probably no smarter way of countering external influence. This is because supporting the Sahel States economically can reduce their reliance on external actors, such as non-African powers, ensuring that regional development aligns with ECOWAS’s long-term interests. Other factors circle around restoration of regional economic integration, strengthening supply chain and food security, and promoting long-term economic growth and stability.
It is not unimportant to consider the Cost-Benefit Perspective where we look at the short-term costs versus long-term gains. While providing incentives may involve short-term financial costs, the long-term benefits, such as increased trade, economic growth, and political stability, far outweigh these initial critical investments. Numerous studies have proven that infrastructure investments and trade facilitation measures generate a multipliereffect by stimulating private sector growth, increasing government revenues, and improving living standards.
African Union (AU) as key Pan-African Mediator
A role naturally cut out for the African Union is that of Neutral Mediation, facilitating dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and other stakeholders to prevent further fragmentation of the region. A Continental Security Strategy is an imperative of our time. This should aim to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It should also address the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel, ensuring a coordinated response to terrorism and political instability. The newly elected President of the African Union Commission, Ambassador Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose mantra is “Silencing the Guns” has an obligation to ensuring that all nations of Africa, especially his native Djibouti return to constitutional order. Another critical role for the AU is the mobilisation of humanitarian assistance to mitigate the impact of border closures and economic disruptions on vulnerable populations, promoting regional stability and goodwill.
The broader International Community as Enablers of Sustainable Development and Governance
An essential component of sustainable peace and development is Diplomatic Engagement. The United Nations, European Union, and other international partners should support AU and ECOWAS-led mediation efforts, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. The region must be provided with targeted security assistance to help both ECOWAS and AES states combat terrorism, while ensuring that such support aligns with international human rights standards. They should increase investments in sustainable development, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to address the root causes of conflict and foster long-term stability. Related to this is capacity building. The AU should support governance reforms, anti-corruption measures, and inclusive political processes to strengthen state institutions and improve governance in both ECOWAS and AES countries.
No strategic approach to negotiated settlement of the crises with the Alliance of Sahel States can be said to be cast in stones but a well- considered implementation roadmap can certainly be put in place. A three-phase roadmap of short, medium, and long term is recommended.
The short term is a six-month duration in whichdiplomatic dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and the AU is initiated. The focus will be on confidence-building measures and reducing tensions. In a subsequent eighteen-month medium term phase, joint security initiatives should be recommended to implement economic incentives to encourage regional cooperation. This then ushers in a five-year long term phase of consolidation, promotion of sustainable development, and good governance, ensuring that the root causes of conflict and insecurity are addressed.
In conclusion, the pressing issue remains the military coups and the return to constitutional order. In hindsight, the immediate use of threats and sanctions by ECOWAS has proven ineffective in addressing the series of military takeovers. However, recent actions indicate that ECOWAS has learned valuable lessons and is now striving to balance its commitment to democratic governance with the need for peace and stability in the Sahel. By prioritizing dialogue, supporting socioeconomic development, and addressing the root causes of political instability, ECOWAS can facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. This approach not only aims to maintain regional unity and long-term stability but also demonstrates strength and resilience, not weakness.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
Policy and regulatory reforms for local refiners and importers for fair competition in Nigeria’s petroleum market.
The government must implement a balanced regulatory framework. This is necessary to guarantee fair competition between local refiners and importers in Nigeria’s petroleum market. The framework should promote investment in local refining while ensuring market efficiency. I see 4 Key policy or regulatory reforms:
1. Market-based pricing mechanism
2. Infrastructure and logistics support
3. Fair Taxation and Incentives
4. Strengthening Regulatory Oversight
Market-Based Pricing Mechanism should be a priority reform. We have seen it work in India. For instance, the country deregulated petrol prices in 2010 and diesel prices in 2014. This enabled private refiners like Reliance Industries to compete fairly with state-owned companies, improving supply chain efficiency. Under this arrangement, Dangote Refineries can seamlessly compete with NNPCL.
I’m indifferent about Subsidy Reform. If subsidies must exist, they should be targeted and transparent. They should guarantee that subsidies do not disproportionately help importers or disadvantage local refiners. More important for me is Deregulation of Petroleum Prices. Government should allow market forces to set fuel prices. This ensures that local refiners and importers compete on a level playing field.
Another priority reform area is Infrastructure and Logistics Support. There should be equal access to storage and distribution networks. I align with the Petroleum Products Retail Outlets Owners Association of Nigeria (PETROAN) on this. They advocate for a holistic market. Nigeria-based refiners, importers, depot owners, and retail outlets should have a level playing field to operate. Local refiners should have unhindered access to pipelines, storage depots, and distribution channels controlled by state-owned NNPCL or private companies.
Critical in this is Port and Customs efficiency. There should be streamlining of import/export regulations to reduce cost disparities between imported and locally refined products. United States offers perhaps a good model to strive towards. In the U.S., Pipeline Open Access Rules are enforced by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). These rules ensure that refiners and importers have fair access to transport infrastructure. They prevent monopolistic practices.
In the area of Fair Taxation and Incentives, Nigeria can look to Brazil for a lesson or two. Brazil offers tax incentives for domestic refining. The country ensures importers are not unduly burdened. This allows fair competition between local producers and foreign suppliers. The current Head of Nigerian Mission ad interim in Brazil is Ambassador Basil Okolo. He and I had similar conversations years ago. This occurred while he served here in Brussels. I hope that by experiencing the Brazilian example close-up, he would properly guide the government. Working closely with Nigerian Diaspora leaders in Brazil, like Mr. Chika ORI, will also help in this direction.
A letter to Donald J. Trump from Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, a Saudi prince and former government official who served as the head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Presidency from 1979 to 2001. He is a grandson of Saudi’s founder King Abdulaziz and son of King Faisal. He is the chairman of the King Faisal Foundation’s Center for Research and Islamic Studies.
The letter:
Dear President Trump
The Palestinian people are not illegal immigrants to be deported to other lands. The lands are their lands and the houses that Israel destroyed are their homes, and they will rebuild them as they have done after previous Israeli onslaughts on them.
Most of the people of Gaza are refugees, driven out of their homes in what is now Israel and the West Bank by the previous Israeli genocidal assault on them in the 1948 and 1967 wars. If they are to be moved from Gaza, they should be allowed to return to their homes and to their orange and olive groves in Haifa, Jaffa and other towns and villages from which they fled or were forcibly driven out by the Israelis.
Mr President, many of the tens of thousands of immigrants who came to Palestine from Europe and other places after the Second World War stole Palestinian homes and land, terrorised the inhabitants and engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Alas, America and the UK, the victors of the war, stood by and even facilitated the murderous evictions of the Palestinians from their homes and lands.
America and the UK did not want to receive the victims of Adolf Hitler’s Holocaust, so they were content with sending them to Palestine. In the book Eight Days at Yalta, the author Diana Preston refers to a conversation between then US president Franklin Roosevelt and his Russian counterpart Joseph Stalin. Preston writes: “Conversation turned to the subject of Jewish homelands. Roosevelt said he was a Zionist… When Stalin asked Roosevelt what present he planned to make [Saudi king] Ibn Saud, he replied his only concession might be to give him six million Jews…”
Fortunately, when Mr Roosevelt did meet Ibn Saud, the king disabused him of that offer and suggested that the Jews should be offered the best lands in Germany as compensation for the Holocaust. Alas, Harry Truman, Roosevelt’s successor, wholeheartedly supported Jewish immigration to Palestine and eventually became instrumental in the creation of Israel.
The violence and bloodshed we witness today are the result of that action and the previous British complicity with Zionist ambitions from 1917 until then.
Mr President, your declared intent to bring peace to Palestine is much lauded in our part of the world. I respectfully suggest that the way to do that is to give the Palestinians their inalienable right to self-determination and a state with its capital in East Jerusalem, as envisaged in UN General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194 and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Arab Peace Initiative.
All the Arab and Islamic countries, as well as the Palestinian Authority, accept the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative to end hostilities and establish relations with Israel. One hundred and forty-nine countries recognise the Palestinian state. Please make your country the 150th. No peace in the Middle East will be realised without addressing this noble issue justly and fairly.
Meet Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, first female President-Elect of Namibia. She will assume office on 21 March 2025 following her victory in the 27 November 2024 Presidential Elections. Being Namibia’s first female president is a landmark event with significant implications for the nation’s political and economic landscape. Her campaign’s emphasis on job creation and economic development through economic diplomacy addresses Namibia’s pressing challenges, notably high unemployment and economic inequality.
Campaigning under the political platform of South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) on the back of economic diplomacy, Nandi-Ndaitwah joins a league of notable but sparse presidential campaigns across the world, from developed to developing economies, that centered on economic diplomacy, emphasising international partnerships, trade, and economic reforms to drive development. This is uncommon yet deserving of interrogation. Can her narrow margin of victory of 57% be ascribed to her choice of campaign focus on economic diplomacy despite worse predictions? This remains to be seen. It is however instructive to note that SWAPO political decline set in with the 2019 elections when the party received 56% of the vote, down from a whopping 87% in 2014. SWAPO, which gained its base fighting against Apartheid in 1990, is seemingly losing support among youth voters, who are dissatisfied with low employment rates.
A window to Netumbonomics
Madam President-Elect focused her campaign typically on job creation and economic development. A look at the economic components of her campaign manifesto will provide the lens through which her economic ideology or Nebumbonomics could be examined. She pledged to invest N$85 billion to create 550,000 jobs over the next half-decade, targeting sectors such as agriculture, construction, and oil and gas. This initiative aims to reduce the youth unemployment rate, which is estimated to be over 50%.
As means to achieving her job creation goal, her strategy involves leveraging Namibia’s natural resources to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) while ensuring that such investments align with national interests. By promoting value addition in sectors like mining and agriculture, she seeks to enhance local production and export capacity, thereby stimulating economic growth and job creation.
Beyond job creation, there are other indications that Nandi-Ndaitwah’s presidential victory may be attributed to her emphasis on economic diplomacy, which resonated with the electorate. There are four additional reasons to consider as constituting the backbone of Netumbonomics, that powered her victory.
Firstly, her commitment to economic diplomacy aimed at attracting foreign investment to stimulate economic growth. By fostering international partnerships, she is seeking to enhance sectors like mining, tourism, and agriculture, thereby diversifying the economy and creating employment opportunities.
Secondly, she made a point out of addressing economic inequality. Namibia is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank but remains highly unequal, with 43% of the population living in multidimensional poverty as of 2021. Nandi-Ndaitwah emphasised the need for land reform and a fairer distribution of wealth. She drew from examples from elsewhere in Africa and global best practices in women empowerment, giving insights to a strategy that will invite through diplomacy, women with economic power around the world to inspire, motivate, and invest in Namibian women. Her appeal to voters seeking economic justice appears to have resonated well.
Thirdly, recent offshore oil and gas discoveries have the potential to significantly boost Namibia’s economy. Nandi-Ndaitwah’s focus on economic diplomacy included plans to utilize these resources to double the country’s GDP growth to 8% within a decade, promising improved livelihoods for Namibians.
Finally, as a seasoned politician with extensive experience in government, including a stint as Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Nandi-Ndaitwah’s economic diplomacy platform offered continuity and stability. Her leadership was perceived as a means to maintain peace and stability while implementing necessary economic reforms, which appealed to voters desiring a steady hand during transformative times.
While Namibia’s election of its first female President is a historical milestone, it is her decision to anchor her campaign on economic diplomacy that appears to be a game changer for the continent. Her victory represents a significant step toward gender equality in African leadership. It could be argued that what delivered her victory was more of her policy shifts and economic transformation agenda, more than the focus on economic diplomacy. Before comparing her strategy with those of contemporary political leaders across the world, it may be instructive to assert that her commitment to “radical shifts” in addressing poverty and unemployment suggests potential departures from previous policies. She focused on equitable wealth distribution and land reform as pointed out earlier. By prioritizing economic diplomacy, she aims to transform Namibia’s economy from one reliant on raw material exports to a more diversified and industrialized economy, enhancing resilience and sustainability.
Contemporary pacesetters on economic diplomacy as political strategy
There seems to be a thread that runs through a set of themes for political leaders that have anchored their campaign strategies on economic diplomacy, which may offer some clue on where Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah is coming from. The themes across the campaigns have typically included global integration, infrastructure and industry, natural resources endowments, and regional leadership.
Candidates often emphasize strengthening their country’s position in global trade. Many, if not all of the examined campaigns promote FDI for large-scale development projects. The resource endowed nations amongst them have used economic diplomacy to attract ethical and sustainable investments while aiming to position their economies as regional economic hubs. Despite some variables, the campaigns generally show how economic diplomacy can be a powerful narrative, especially in countries seeking economic transformation and greater global influence.
Here is a paintbrush of notable presidential campaigns across the world that centered on economic diplomacy, emphasizing international partnerships, trade, and economic reforms to drive development, from which Nandi-Ndaitwah may have drawn inspiration.
Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria, 1999) Unlike Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, economic diplomacy was not Olusegun Obasanjo’s sole campaign theme. However, it was a cornerstone of his broader promise to restore stability, improve governance, and lay the foundation for economic growth in Nigeria. His approach was shaped by Nigeria’s economic challenges in the aftermath of military rule and his commitment to reestablishing Nigeria’s position in the global economic and diplomatic landscape.
Key aspects of the Obasanjo strategy include a focus on debt relief, emphasising his ability to engage with international financial institutions and foreign governments to address Nigeria’s crippling foreign debt. Upon election, his administration’s efforts led to significant debt forgiveness, which was a key part of his economic diplomacy. He made demonstrable efforts to reintegrate Nigeria’s economy into the Global Economy. Following years of isolation under military rule, Obasanjo’s campaign pledged to rebuild Nigeria’s reputation internationally. He highlighted his previous leadership experience, as military head of state in the period 1976–1979 and his global network, promising to attract foreign investment and improve trade relations.
It was clear from his consultations pre-election that if he undertakes economic reforms, international support will be easier to secure. Obasanjo’s platform therefore inevitably included promises to reform Nigeria’s economy through privatization, liberalization, and improved governance. This resonated with voters and the international community, positioning him as a candidate capable of modernizing Nigeria’s economy. His Advocacy for Regional Integration turned out to be a winning strategy as he also campaigned on leveraging Nigeria’s position as a regional leader in West Africa to strengthen economic ties and enhance trade within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Enjoying high personal credibility as he did at the time, Obasanjo’s international reputation as an advocate for African development lent credibility to his promises of fostering economic diplomacy. His antecedents including his work with organisations like the United Nations and the African Leadership Forum and his post-election actions, including extensive international outreach and reforms, reinforced the campaign promises centered on economic diplomacy.
Barack Obama’s (USA, 2008 & 2012) key focus was on economic recovery post-2008 financial crisis. He approached his economic diplomacy from the angle of strengthening trade ties with emerging markets in Asia and Africa. The means to his goal was advocating for multilateral trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and promoting innovation and clean energy partnerships with Europe and China. The major outcome of his strategy was that it positioned the U.S. as a global economic leader during a period of economic uncertainty.
Narendra Modi’s (India, 2014 & 2019) main attention was on conomic growth, “Make in India,” and global investment. His economic diplomacy point of departure was promoting India as an investment destination through campaigns like “Make in India.” Strategically, he signed bilateral agreements with Japan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the U.S. for infrastructure and trade development while proactively participating in global forums like BRICS, G20, and the UN to bolster India’s economic positioning. His major deliverable was increased FDI inflows and global partnerships, though challenges like domestic economic inequality persist, as the gap between the rich and the poor grew wider.
Emmanuel Macron (France, 2017 & 2022) pitched his tent around liberal economic reforms and stronger EU integration. In terms of economic diplomacy, his angle was a push for stronger, unified EU economy through deeper market integration while he attracted foreign investment by proposing pro-business reforms of which an intentional strategy was labour market deregulation as he laid the foundation stones to strengthening trade relationships with Asia and pivoting a new Africa policy from the Anglophone economies. While Macron has so far successfully positioned France as a global economic player, he continues as of 2025 to face domestic resistance to reforms and waning influence in Africa.
Joko Widodo (Indonesia, 2014 & 2019) was a proponent of global infrastructure and trade partnerships. His economic diplomacy strategic direction emphasised investments from China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and strengthened partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. for manufacturing, R&D, and technology transfer. He mounted a strong advocacy for Indonesia as a hub for Southeast Asian trade, all of which resulted in improved infrastructure and trade opportunities. One critical downside though was criticisms of overreliance on foreign capital.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s (Liberia, 2005) post-conflict reconstruction and economic rebuilding enjoyed enormous global goodwill. She strategically converted the goodwill into economic diplomacy, which garnered international aid and investment through partnerships, notably with the U.S., EU, and China. President Sirleaf promoted natural resource management reforms to attract ethical investment resulting in secured substantial foreign aid and investment, laying the foundation for Liberia’s economic recovery.
Moon Jae-in (South Korea, 2017) zeroed in on peace on the Korean Peninsula and economic revitalization, of which his economic diplomacy angle was advocacy for inter-Korean economic cooperation to attract investment and foster peace. Jae-in strengthened South Korea’s position as a technological and economic leader through global trade agreements. The outcome was a stabilised South Korean economy with significant expansion of its global partnerships.
Nana Akufo-Addo’s (Ghana, 2016 & 2020) key focus was on economic self-reliance and foreign investments while approaching economic diplomacy from the angle of strengthening of ties with China, the U.S., and EU nations for industrialization and infrastructure development. Genuine efforts were made to take the shine off aids with the launch of initiatives such as “Ghana Beyond Aid”. The efforts resulted in the boosting of Ghana’s reputation as an investment destination, especially in the mining and tech industries.
Conclusion
President-elect Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah’s victory and her focus on job creation and economic diplomacy hold the promise of significant positive changes for Namibia, provided that her administration can effectively implement the proposed strategies. Implementing her ambitious plans will require overcoming challenges such as securing the necessary funding, ensuring effective governance, and addressing potential resistance to reforms. Additionally, fostering a conducive environment for FDI while safeguarding national interests will be crucial.
Collins Nweke is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria, Institute of Managements Consultants, and Distingushed Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he also serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
