Tag: Diaspora

Navigating the Sahel Crisis: A Strategic Framework for Stability in ECOWAS

When Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso abruptly withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forming the Alliance of Sahel States (also known by its French acronym AES) some did not take them seriously. The olive branch extended by some critical stakeholders keen to see a de-escalation in the crisis began to lower in January 2024 when the trio formally withdrew from the bloc. Anger, resentment, and other emotions may be inevitable. However every prudent leader must realise that a comprehensive and inclusive approach is essential to prevent the AES formation from leading to further regional instability. By fostering dialogue, enhancing security cooperation, and promoting sustainable development, ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community must play a role  in building a more united and prosperous West Africa.

Before delving into the specific roles of the core regional, continental, and global stakeholders, it is essential to provide an overview of how we arrived at this point. As of February 2025, the government of Niger Republic has implemented several significant changes to its border regulations, particularly affecting its relationship with Nigeria. There have been border closures and reopenings following the military coup in July 2023. The introduction of new travel documents followed swiftly. In line with AES initiatives, Niger introduced a joint biometric passport for its citizens, to facilitate movement within the alliance. However, this new passport has faced recognition challenges from non-AES countries, like Senegal. This led to trade restrictions, when in October 2024, Niger imposed a comprehensive ban on food exports to countries outside the AES, including Nigeria. This measure was officially positioned as a means  to boost agricultural self-reliance within the alliance but it has (unintentionally?) disrupted traditional trade flows between Niger and Nigeria. 

Without doubts, these developments reflect Niger’s shift towards strengthening ties with its immediate neighbours within the AES framework, while asserting its sovereignty and redefining its relationships and border policies with countries like Nigeria. The core question remains whether or not Niger has focused only on the gains of its moves and has overlooked the potential losses

Gains and Losses from Niger-Nigeria Border War

The border closures created short-term economic and social hardships, particularly for vulnerable populations and businesses. However, they also presented opportunities for improving national security, promoting local economic development, and asserting political independence. Long-term gains will depend on the success of Niger’s domestic policies and its cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States. We must remember that the first attempt at a Sahel alliance fell apart. Could it be that it will succeed this time around because they are dancing to the tunes of more determined foreign drummers focused on redrawing the World Order? That remains to be seen. But as far as our mortal eyes can carry us, we can’t lose sight of some obvious gains.

The Gains

The gain that springs most obviously to the eyes is security enhancement. The border closures aimed to curb the movement of armed groups, smuggling, and other illicit activities, contributing to national security, particularly in Niger, which faces threats from extremist groups.  The border closures led to a temporary reduction in cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking. A boost to domestic production is another important gain in the stride to agricultural self-sufficiency. By reducing dependency on imports, Niger sought to encourage local agricultural production, supporting its intentional national food security goals and local industry sufficiency. The restrictions provided opportunities for local industries to meet domestic demand, fostering industrial growth.

There is also political leverage that we may not discontenance. For Niger, the border closures were part of a broader strategy to assert its sovereignty and negotiate better terms in regional alliances, particularly after its exit from ECOWAS and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The Losses

Analysts for Niger of the costs-benefits of their border strategy have a number of losses to contend with. For a start, economic disruption by way of trade decline is a critical factor. The border closures severely impacted cross-border trade. Both formal and informal trade, including agricultural products, livestock, and manufactured goods, experienced significant reductions. The attendant revenue loss has had significant impact on the fragile economy.  Governments of both Niger and Nigeria lost customs duties and taxes collected from cross-border trade, impacting national and local economies. The humanitarian impact manifesting in food insecurity was pretty visible. Niger, which relies on food imports from Nigeria, faced increased food insecurity. Rising food prices worsened conditions for vulnerable populations. Many small-scale traders, transporters, and border communities that depend on cross-border trade for their livelihoods faced economic hardship.

The social and cultural disruptions is another critical loss. It is said that in the border area between Niger and Nigeria, some homes have their living rooms in one country and their bedrooms in the other country. In other words, limited movement and restrictions on free movement of people disrupted daily life. Families and communities with cross-border ties are  separated, affecting social cohesion, employment, and education opportunities, especially for those who frequently crossed borders, not to mention the strained diplomatic relations between Niger and Nigeria.

The Strategic Approach

To address the potential crisis resulting from the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, a coordinated and pragmatic approach is essential. ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and the broader international community should prioritize diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, and socioeconomic development to foster regional stability.

ECOWAS as key actor

The ECOWAS has the prime responsibility of demonstrating good faith by efforts at rebuilding trust for regional unity. The bloc is formally on records to have started off well. In its 29 January 2025 Declaration formally acknowledging the withdrawal of the trio of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, it placed a four-point instruction before member states as follows:

1.     recognize National passports and identity cards bearing ECOWAS logo held by the citizens of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger, until further notice.

2.     continue to treat goods and services coming from the three countries in accordance with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and investment policy.

3.     allow citizens of the three affected countries to continue to enjoy the right of visa free movement, residence and establishment in accordance with the ECOWAS protocols until further notice.

4.     provide full support and cooperation to ECOWAS officials from the three countries in the course of their assignments for the Community.

Determined to avoid confusion and disruption in the lives and businesses of the ECOWAS population during what it described as a transition period, the instruction to member states added that the arrangements will be in place until the full determination of the modalities of our future engagement with the three countries by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Governments. The Commission has set up a structure to facilitate discussions on these modalities with each of the three countries.

It could be gleaned from the ECOWAS statement that it pays or intends to pay premium to Inclusive Dialogue when it indicated the establishment of requisite structure to facilitate discussions on modalities with each of the three Sahel economies. Without delay and despite the new border regulations announced recently by Niger, ECOWAS should initiate high-level diplomatic dialogues with the AES states, ensuring that their security and governance concerns are addressed within the framework of regional integration. The dialogue should aim to rebuild trust and explore pathways for their re-entry into ECOWAS.

Talking of framework, ECOWAS can be served better by a flexible governance framework. It should consider revising its governance protocols to accommodate the specific political and security challenges faced by Sahel states, promoting inclusivity and understanding. There must be Security Collaboration with the establishment of joint security initiatives with AES to combat terrorism, insurgency, and cross-border crime, reinforcing collective security while respecting the sovereignty of member states.

Some may find this misplaced but from an economic standpoint, providing incentives to AES states is a strategic investment that can restore regional economic integration, stabilise food supply chains, reduce the costs of conflict, and strengthen ECOWAS’s long-term influence. By promoting inclusive economic growth and enhancing trade and infrastructure, ECOWAS can foster a more prosperous and interconnected West Africa, benefiting all member states in the long run.

Of all the arguments in support of a strategic approach to managing the Sahel States crisis, the most compelling perhaps is the need to maintain strategic geopolitical and economic influence. Providing economic incentives reinforces ECOWAS’s role as the primary regional organization, strengthening its influence and maintaining regional cohesion. There is probably no smarter way of countering external influence. This is because supporting the Sahel States economically can reduce their reliance on external actors, such as non-African powers, ensuring that regional development aligns with ECOWAS’s long-term interests. Other factors circle around restoration of regional economic integration, strengthening supply chain and food security, and promoting long-term economic growth and stability.

It is not unimportant to consider the Cost-Benefit Perspective where we look at the short-term costs versus long-term gains. While providing incentives may involve short-term financial costs, the long-term benefits, such as increased trade, economic growth, and political stability, far outweigh these initial critical investments. Numerous studies have proven that infrastructure investments and trade facilitation measures generate a multiplier effect by stimulating private sector growth, increasing government revenues, and improving living standards.

African Union (AU) as key Pan-African Mediator

A role naturally cut out for the African Union is that of Neutral Mediation, facilitating dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and other stakeholders to prevent further fragmentation of the region. A Continental Security Strategy is an imperative of our time. This should aim to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It should also address the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel, ensuring a coordinated response to terrorism and political instability. The newly elected President of the African Union Commission, Ambassador Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose mantra is “Silencing the Guns” has an obligation to ensuring that all nations of Africa, especially his native Djibouti return to constitutional order. Another critical role for the AU is the mobilisation of humanitarian assistance to mitigate the impact of border closures and economic disruptions on vulnerable populations, promoting regional stability and goodwill.

The broader International Community as Enablers of Sustainable Development and Governance

An essential component of sustainable peace and development is Diplomatic Engagement.  The United Nations, European Union, and other international partners should support AU and ECOWAS-led mediation efforts, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. The region must be provided with targeted security assistance to help both ECOWAS and AES states combat terrorism, while ensuring that such support aligns with international human rights standards. They should increase investments in sustainable development, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to address the root causes of conflict and foster long-term stability. Related to this is capacity building. The AU should support governance reforms, anti-corruption measures, and inclusive political processes to strengthen state institutions and improve governance in both ECOWAS and AES countries.

No strategic approach to negotiated settlement of the crises with the Alliance of Sahel States can be said to be cast in stones but a well- considered implementation roadmap can certainly be put in place. A three-phase roadmap of short, medium, and long term is recommended.

The short term is a six-month duration in which diplomatic dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and the AU is initiated. The focus will be on confidence-building measures and reducing tensions. In a subsequent eighteen-month medium term phase, joint security initiatives should be recommended to implement economic incentives to encourage regional cooperation. This then ushers in a five-year long term phase of consolidation, promotion of sustainable development, and good governance, ensuring that the root causes of conflict and insecurity are addressed.

In conclusion, the pressing issue remains the military coups and the return to constitutional order. In hindsight, the immediate use of threats and sanctions by ECOWAS has proven ineffective in addressing the series of military takeovers. However, recent actions indicate that ECOWAS has learned valuable lessons and is now striving to balance its commitment to democratic governance with the need for peace and stability in the Sahel. By prioritizing dialogue, supporting socioeconomic development, and addressing the root causes of political instability, ECOWAS can facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. This approach not only aims to maintain regional unity and long-term stability but also demonstrates strength and resilience, not weakness.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management  Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.

Keynoting Omenaimo 2024

I’ve never had to give a public talk about being Igbo. That will change on Sunday 8 September when I will be keynoting Omenaimo ImoDay 2024 in Dublin Ireland.

I’d be deploying some personal narratives and some social theories in a storytelling format to try to do justice to the topic of #inculturation #identity #culture #interculture. Here is a pretaste of what #Umuimo #Ndigbo and #Nigerians in Ireland 🇮🇪 can expect from me:

When Mazi Utuagbaigwe insisted that he is not giving Adaeze’s hands in marriage to his Belgian son-in-law, if he does not perform the Igba Nkwu rites, was he being insensitive to the culture of his host country or being chauvinistic? Can it be judiciously argued that inviting his in-laws to negotiate his daughter’s bride price is an affront to European laws and culture? And what about his rebuke to his daughter and her husband that among the Igbos, marriage is an affair for both the immediate and extended family and he cannot have any of them question whoever he decides to identify as that extended family? What about tutoring his son-in-law that under no circumstances should he even think of calling him or his Lolo by their first names, he must call them what he hears Adaeze calls them! How does any of these strongly held positions hamper integration into their host community in Europe?

The Diaspora as Drivers of Service Export for Nigeria

youtube.com/watch

In this conversation with TVC Breakfast anchored on my policy recommendation for an organised service export for Nigeria, I highlighted the Diaspora component of Nigeria’s current Renewed 4D Foreign Policy doctrine as providing the required framework.

US-Nigeria Partnership in a Changing Global Arena

Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, H.E. Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, offered his perspectives, and the 4D strategic vision for and on the evolving Nigeria-United States partnership.

At the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, H.E. Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, offered his perspectives on the evolving Nigeria-United States partnership. The event, “US-Nigeria Partnership in the Changing Global Arena,” drew a distinguished audience comprising diplomatic figures, former US ambassadors to Nigeria, and policy experts. Moderated by Oge Onubogu, Director of the Wilson Center‘s Africa Program, the discussion centered on the multidimensional relationship between the two countries and its broader ramifications for global security and development.


Nigeria’s Strategic Role and Demographic Potential

Minister Tuggar emphasized the historical depth and strength of the US-Nigeria relationship, which dates back to Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Highlighting Nigeria’s role as a regional leader in Africa, he underscored Nigeria’s significant population, with over 200 million people, half of whom are under the age of 30, presenting both challenges and opportunities for the nation and the importance of collaboration in areas such as security, economic development, and democratic governance. The minister’s remarks were timely, coming on the heels of the recently concluded sixth US-Nigeria Binational Commission in Abuja, where both nations reaffirmed their commitment to addressing shared challenges.

The “4D” Agenda: Democracy, Development, Demography, and Diaspora

One of the central themes of Tuggar’s address was Nigeria’s new foreign policy vision, encapsulated in the “4D” agenda: Democracy, Development, Demography, and Diaspora – under President Bola Tinubu. He articulated how these pillars are integral to Nigeria’s strategy to navigate the complexities of the current global landscape.

Emphasizing Nigeria’s commitment to democracy, the minister highlighted the nation’s role in promoting democratic values across the African continent. He noted that Nigeria, with its demographic, is poised to harness the dividend of its growing population to drive sustainable development and economic growth.

On development, Minister Tuggar stressed the importance of infrastructure projects and economic reforms aimed at creating jobs and fostering inclusive growth. He outlined Nigeria’s ambitious infrastructure development plans, including the expansion of broadband cabling, the adoption of 5G technology, and the construction of gas pipelines to leverage Nigeria’s significant gas reserves; noting the importance of trade and investment partnerships with the United States to support these initiatives.

Engaging the Nigeria Diaspora community is a key focus of the administration; whether in terms of investment opportunities or tapping its diaspora human capital. The minister called for greater investment in Nigeria’s vast gas reserves as a transition fuel, which would support industrialization and energy security while also addressing climate change concerns. He spoke about the significance of intellectual property rights in protecting Nigeria’s burgeoning creative industries, which include Nollywood and the Afrobeats music scenes; buttressing the role the music genre has played in putting Nigeria on the global stage.

Security Cooperation and Counterterrorism

Addressing the issue of security, Tuggar acknowledged the challenges posed by terrorism and transnational crime in the West African region. He called for enhanced US-Nigeria cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, including the provision of advanced military equipment and training. The minister also highlighted Nigeria’s commitment to human rights and transparency in its security operations, noting the establishment of a human rights desk within the Nigerian Army.

The conversation also touched on Nigeria’s strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, with Ambassador Tuggar affirming the nation’s non-aligned stance. He stressed the importance of homegrown solutions to African problems and warned against the presence of foreign mercenaries and private military companies in the region. The minister reiterated Nigeria’s opposition to any form of external dominance and called for partnerships that respect Nigeria’s sovereignty and promote mutual benefit.

Internal Security Challenges and International Partnerships

Minister Tuggar also addressed Nigeria’s internal security challenges, particularly the fight against terrorism and insurgency. He highlighted the critical role of international partnerships in providing the necessary weapons, equipment, and technical support to combat these threats effectively. The minister called for a reevaluation of restrictions like the Leahy Law, which prohibits the sale of certain military equipment to Nigeria, arguing that such limitations hinder Nigeria’s ability to address security threats comprehensively.

Israel-Palestine Conflicts and Nigeria’s Stance

A key highlight of the discussion was Nigeria’s stance on global conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestine crisis and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Minister Tuggar expressed Nigeria’s support for a two-state solution in the Israel-Palestine conflict and reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to upholding principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in Ukraine.

The event marked Minister Tuggar’s first official visit to Washington, D.C., and he expressed optimism about the future of US-Nigeria relations.

ENDING THE AFFRONT TO THE RULE OF LAW

In this open letter to the Chairman, House Committee on Diaspora, Hon. Sir Tochukwu Okere, he was charged by Collins Nweke to address the Elephant in the room, which is how he wishes history to remember his Chairmanship.

As you settle into office, Honourable House Committee Chairman, Sir Tochukwu Okere, I note with optimism that you have commenced a consultation round with Diaspora Stakeholders. This can only mean that you have a desire to understand the Diaspora landscape, know the issues and challenges as well as the opportunities and prospects. This is normal approach. But not in Nigeria! Take it from a confirmed source that as basic as this gesture is, those before you have never taken off in this manner. In Nigeria, we are used to commending people for doing the job for which they are paid. I’m sure you don’t want me to do that. Instead let me congratulate you for a start on your new appointment.

I want this note to be as brief as possible. I will therefore be short on details and precise on facts but ready to engage further in areas requiring expatiation. To provide the basis for the dynamics that led us to where we are on Nigerian Diaspora affairs and to where we are going, I will crave your indulgence to precede it with a paintbrush of the Pre-2000 era.

Pre-2000 Era of Nigerian Diaspora Affairs

Historically, the first poll of Nigerian Diaspora left the shores of the country for study purposes. Vast majority returned; a few stayed back for family reasons, including marriage to host country nationals, raising a family, and career related matters. The initial poll of migration out of Nigeria was added to by the civil war induced migration, some forced, others sponsored again for study purposes. Return and remain pattern, post studies was same as the pioneer group. Forced migration linked to military misrule, economic hardship, could be considered as the third wave of Nigerian Diaspora build-up in Europe and the United States. This was underscored by Nigerian exiles, fugitives, refugees and asylum seekers.

The major take away from this Nigerian Diaspora era is that these sojourning citizens were loosely organised along ethnicity, political, and pressure group lines. There was no formal link with the Government of Nigeria. Understandly so because of the low trust level or complete absence of it. The infamous Umaru Dikko London abduction saga explains enough. 

Post-2000 Era

Following the return to civil rule after the 1999 elections, there was a realisation of the quantum and quality of Nigerian Diaspora across the globe. A major characteristic of the group is that they were still organised along ethnicity and interests. In itself, not a huge problem except that they were often in competition, not collaboration, with one another. There was also absence of a formal channel of communication with Government. Given the deep division within the Diaspora on how to be formally organised, the touring President-Elect, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, decided to have series of Millennial Assemblies of Nigerians in the Americas and in Europe on assumption of office. The two main questions to resolve were: should Government adopt / recognise a single existing organisation as the official partner of government on Diaspora affairs or make a clean start with a new entity? The verdict of the Conferences attended by thousands of Nigerians anxious for a reinvigorated engagement with fatherland was overwhelmingly to make a clean start. There lies the birth of Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO).

The challenges

The establishment of NIDO quickly threw up a few challenges, some of which are inevitable while others are man-manufactured and therefore avoidable.

For a start, some strong influential, perhaps recalcitrant voices against establishment of NIDO never gave up their opposition, despite the fact that the decision was a democratically and organically taken one. The NIDO opposition group was joined by some early NIDO enthusiasts who could not play the NIDO democratic politics, having gotten used to the partriarchic organising model prevalent in community organisations. They felt more comfortable opting out of NIDO to compete with it. Government officials and political office holders tasked with supporting NIDO or mandated to do so equally have pro-NIDO and anti-NIDO forces.

The most important conclusion to draw at this point is that the best performing Chapters of NIDO are in jurisdictions where there is a supportive Ambassador. Ukraine and later Switzerland  come to mind. NIDO is also known to have made the most progress in times when political office holders underwrite the notion of relating with NIDO as the official body and encouraging other groups to collaborate rather than compete with it. We must equally take something away from the fact that the passage of the Act for the establishment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) into law (a Bill) took place during the 8th Assembly under a House Committee Chairman that honoured without reservation, government policy of establishing a formal channel of communication with the Diaspora through NIDO.

The elephant in the room 

I make bold to ask, Honourable Chairman House Committee on Diaspora, how do you wish to be remembered? This question is the elephant in the room. There are two broad  options open to you, organisationally and legislatively, if you ask me.

On the organisational side of the ledger, you could have your time in office be associated with an era in Nigerian history that got the Nigerian Diaspora equitably organised. Yes, NIDO is as of today the official representative of the Diaspora but who says that the representation as it is today is cast in concrete and can’t be reviewed and made more wholesome for Nigeria. I’m sure your round of consultations is giving you indications of necessary reforms. Is there a reason your time in office can’t be credited with transparently organising the Diaspora table boldly and audaciously? Yours must be an era when a political office holder is a Diaspora galvaniser rather than a champion of divide and rule. Your era could be one that sees an organised Diaspora population not as a threat to your personal ambitions but a value adding asset to Nigeria.

On the legislative side of the ledger, history beckons you my Honourable Chairman House Committee on Diaspora to end the current impunity and rascality whereby the Bill establishing the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission stipulates that there shall be a Board with 12 Diaspora members yet four years since its establishment, no such Board exists. Maintaining a cordial working relationship with NIDCOM is absolutely desirable for your Committee but so too is a good relationship with the target group of the policy you are meant to provide oversight for. You must resist any attempt by any side of these entities to pitch you against the other. You need no permission from NIDO to relate with NIDCOM and vice versa. Your independence of mind and thought in the execution of your oversight function will be critical to your success as Chairman House Committee on Diaspora. 

Still on the legislative plank, I am aware that most people anchor their arguments for Diaspora Voting on the US$23 Billion (on the average) of annual Diaspora Remittances. While this is substantial, Diaspora remittance remains today a welfare, consumption capital. As House Chair you can change that into investment capital through bonds, infrastructure investment fund, and so forth. Beyond that, I happen to believe that the strongest argument for Diaspora Voting is that not making it happen is antithetical to democracy, if not an affront to the rule of law. Making it happen will equally help to unlock the hidden potentials for accelerating national development of Nigeria using the assets that the Diaspora brings to the table. Above all, history will have your name and those of your House Committee members engraved in gold if the 10th Assembly by your intentional leadership makes Diaspora Voting a reality.

Collins Nweke was Chief Executive of Nigerian Diaspora Organisation Europe prior to serving as Board Chairman 2011 – 2013. A current third term Green Municipal Legislator for Social Affairs at the Ostend City Council, Belgium, he is an Opinion Maker columnist of The Brussels Times and Foreign Policy Commentator / Global Affairs Analyst with a host of Afrocentric media houses. A Fellow & Vice President of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators, Collins is also a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria.

The Union Now in Bed with its 23 Million Third-Country Nationals

The European Union (EU) has taken a significant step towards fostering a more inclusive and welcoming environment for third-country nationals within its borders. EU Member States have reached an agreement on a negotiating mandate to update the EU Long-Term Residents Directive, which establishes the criteria for non-EU citizens to acquire long-term resident status within the EU.

In a significant move, EU Member States have reached an agreement on a negotiating mandate to update the EU Long-Term Residents Directive, which outlines the criteria for third-country nationals to acquire long-term resident status within the bloc. The proposed updates include a more flexible approach to residency requirements, targeted integration measures, and enhanced intra-EU mobility. These changes are expected to benefit millions of third-country nationals living in the EU.

Major Highlights of EU Long-Term Residency Rules

1. Streamlined Residency Requirements

The proposed updates introduce a more flexible approach to residency requirements, allowing third-country nationals to accumulate residence periods of up to two years in other EU Member States to meet the overall five-year residency requirement. This provision aims to ease the path to long-term resident status for individuals who have moved within the EU for work or study purposes.

Long-term resident status is permanent. However, it can be withdrawn in certain cases, for instance, when a person has not had their main residence in the EU for a certain period of time.said EU Council

2. Targeted Integration Measures

The directive emphasizes the importance of integration for long-term residents, encouraging Member States to implement integration measures tailored to specific needs and circumstances. These measures may include language courses, cultural orientation, and civic education.

3. Enhanced Intra-EU Mobility

EU long-term residents will continue to enjoy the right to intra-EU mobility, enabling them to move and reside in other EU Member States for work, study, or other purposes. However, this right remains subject to certain conditions, such as labour market assessments by Member States to ensure that their domestic labour markets are not negatively impacted.

This right to intra-EU mobility is not an automatic right but is subject to a number of conditions. Such a condition is that member states may assess the situation of their national labour markets in case an EU long-term resident moves to their country from another EU member state for work.

4. Enduring Rights and Protections

Once granted, long-term resident status is permanent, providing individuals with long-term stability and security of residence within the EU. However, the directive also outlines specific circumstances under which this status may be withdrawn, such as prolonged absences from the EU or engagement in activities that threaten public security or order. By streamlining residency requirements, promoting integration, and upholding the right to intra-EU mobility, the directive aims to empower non-EU citizens to contribute meaningfully to EU society and achieve their full potential.

Data Snapshot

According to Eurostat data, as of the end of 2020, approximately 23 million third-country nationals were legally residing in the EU, accounting for 5.1% of the EU population. Among these individuals, over ten million held a long-term permanent residence permit. These figures underscore the growing role of non-EU citizens within the EU’s social fabric.

Conclusion

The proposed updates to the EU Long-Term Resident Status Directive represent a significant step forward in promoting integration and mobility for third-country nationals within the EU.

By streamlining residency requirements, emphasising integration measures, and upholding the right to intra-EU mobility, the directive seeks to foster a more inclusive and welcoming environment for non-EU citizens, enabling them to fully contribute to the EU’s economic, social, and cultural landscape.

Inspired by an article by: Manish Khandelwal | Photo Credit: Freepik

By streamlining residency requirements, emphasizing integration measures, and upholding the right to intra-EU mobility, the directive seeks to foster a more inclusive and welcoming environment for non-EU citizens, enabling them to fully contribute to the EU’s economic, social, and cultural landscape.

Partnerships for Achieving Nigerian Diaspora Voting

Providing editorial consultancy for this documentary film project, it was my pleasure to assemble four critical resource persons under the leadership of Diaspora Industrialist and Author, Dr John C. George, to provide penetrating insights into how far Nigeria has come on Diaspora Voting. The discussants equally delved into what exactly needs to happen to make Diaspora Voting happen. The outcome is a unique cross-fertilisation of ideas.

Nigerian Diaspora Voting may be a long time in coming but it no longer is a matter of if it will happen. It is now a question of when.

NIDCOM ILLEGITIMATELY OPERATING AGAINST ITS ACT?

Nigerians in Diaspora in the Americas will converge in a virtual town hall meeting on Saturday 9 May 2020 with Chairman Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, (NIDCOM) Mrs Abike Dabiri-Erewa. Ahead of the meeting, here are my questions for the Honourable Chairman:

  1. To what extent is NIDCOM legitimate, considering that more than a year after its establishment, its Board has not been constituted? What exactly is the problem?
  2. How effective have you being Madam Chairman, as a lone Board member? Under what checks & balances do you operate NIDCOM without offending the provisions of its Establishment Act?
  3. It’s alleged that some activities of those in Govt. including you, have derailed strategic approach to Diaspora engagement e.g. by overtly/covertly encouraging set up of new Diaspora organisations, thereby defeating Gov. Diaspora Policy. Pls explain.
  4. Nigerian Diaspora is alleged not to be unified, in-fighting… What do you say to those who accuse you and your cohorts of engineering or supporting Diaspora disunity because it favours your agenda? Is a strong Diaspora a threat to you & colleagues?
  5. Don’t you see any incompatibility, if not conflict of interest, in the two positions you occupy concurrently: Senior Special Assistant (SSA) to Mr President on Diaspora and at the same time Chairman of NIDCOM?
  6. Won’t it be more value-adding for Nigeria, transparent, Good Governance as President Mohammadu Buhari advocates, if the role of SSA Diaspora & Chair NIDCOM are independent from each other and occupied by two different persons, not just yourself?
  7. Nearly 20yrs after @NigeriaGov under President Olusegun Obasanjo established NIDO to unify Diaspora input in national development, there are calls for reform of the org. Some clandestine reform efforts have failed. What reforms do you want to see?

Collins Nweke
Belgium ??

Economic Diplomacy & the Diaspora

I was delighted to have made a presentation at a Multi-sectoral Stakeholders Economic Investment Summit organised bySME Secretariat and hosted at the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, Victoria Island, Lagos Nigeria on Monday 21 January 2019

Jeffrey Onyeama Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria

I used the opportunity to review the Nigerian Economic Diplomacy Initiative (NEDI) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari. After a general refresher of what NEDI is all about, I dropped the following conclusions on this policy initiative:

  • NEDI is a strategically important policy tool with huge potentials to make a structural difference in economic regeneration of Nigeria with focus on non-oil sector
  • NEDI made a good start but has clearly not lived up to its biddings. It has failed rather woefully in showing evidence that it has made a convincing start in delivering on the important task of enhancing inter-agency collaborations
  • There is no visible effort on the part of NEDI to genuinely engage the Diaspora in a result-oriented way
  • Unless there is a change of course, NEDI is marked to fail!

I wrapped up with these sets of recommendations:

  • Foreign trade component should be introduced into the operations of all Ministries, Departments & Agencies (MDAs)
  • A NEDI Attaché should have a sitting in all major Missions of Nigeria worldwide where possible or the role unambiguously integrated into the duties of all diplomats charged with economic affairs
  • A formal working relationship should be initiated with Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) worldwide to enhance professional Diaspora mobilization
  • Clear targets should be set for inward investment flows as aconsequence of NEDI activities

Access to the integral PowerPoint Presentation on Economic Diplomacy & the Diaspora is possible:https://1drv.ms/p/s!AuyRKnHzz067wRMWQFFnd28yiaXL